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ARGUMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
JB and Clark argue against indemnification, even though 
the ABP Agreement contains all of the key terms considered of 
importance by the Utah Supreme Court in Freund. JB and Clark also 
ignore the obvious and conclusive effect comparative negligence has 
on the indemnification provisions and the clear need, under the 
facts before the Court to further relax strict construction of this 
rule. For these reasons, the determination of the District Court 
must be reversed. 
II. THE ABP AGREEMENT SHOWS CLEAR INTENT TO INDEMNIFY ABP FOR ITS 
OWN NEGLIGENCE. 
A. Freund Does Not "Reconfinn" Strict Construction. 
JB and Clark both hide behind the strict construction 
rule in arguing that ABP cannot be indemnified for its own 
negligence. Their arguments, however, ignore the pronouncements of 
this Court and the Utah Supreme Court regarding strict 
construction. This Court, in Pickhover v. Smith Management Corp., 
Ill P.2d 664, 667-68 (Utah App. 1989) noted the judicial trend away 
from strict construction. Pickhover notes that the underpinnings 
of the rule, accountability for tort damages, has been undermined 
by the increased use of insurance contracts. 
The following year, the Utah Supreme Court, in Freund v. 
Utah Power & Licrht Company, 793 P.2d 362, 370-71 (Utah 1990), also 
noted the "growing trend to relax some of the strictness of the 
rule." The Supreme Court also agreed to follow the trend in two 
important respects. First, the Court affirms that an indemnity 
provision need not specifically mention a party's ovm negligence in 
order to indemnify a party for its own negligence. Second, the 
Court notes that "the objectives of the parties and the surrounding 
facts and circumstances" must be considered when the agreement is 
construed. Id. 
B. The Freund Agreement And The ABP Agreement Contain The 
Same Key Language, 
Although JB and Clark argue that the ABP indemnity 
provision is not at all similar to the Freund provision, they do so 
by ignoring the key language of importance to the Freund Court. 
Freund focuses on the phrases "any and all", "liabilities" and 
"whatsoever nature" in concluding indemnification was provided. 
Freund, 793 P.2d at 371. Freund also focuses on the fact that one 
paragraph of the indemnity agreement provides less coverage, 
thereby emphasizing the expansive language of the other, broader 
paragraphs. The ABP Agreement contains the key language of 
importance to Freund. It also contains a narrow clause, which 
highlights the broader indemnity provisions. 
I The ABP Agreement (paragraph 5(a)) provides for indemnity 
from and against "any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and 
claims...." (R. 1077.) The ABP Agreement also provides indemnity 
(paragraph 5(d)) against "any and all liability, claims, costs and 
expenses of whatsoever nature...." Id. (R. 1077.) 
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Like Freund. the ABP Agreement also contains an indemnity 
provision for property damage which is narrower in scope, covering 
property damage only "to the extent of the applicable insurance 
which sub-contractor has in force at the time of the 
occurrence...•" (paragraph 5(b)). Like Freund, this narrow clause 
emphasizes the broader language of paragraphs 5 (a) and (d) and 
demonstrates party intent to indemnify. 
C. JB And Clark's Attempts To Distincruish This Case From 
Freund Are Not Persuasive, 
Clark and JB's efforts to distinguish the present case 
from Freund are without merit. Clark and JB have raised several 
issues which, when fully analyzed, do not raise serious questions 
regarding indemnity. 
Clark and JB first argue that the ABP Agreement is 
different because Freund provides "full and complete" indemnity. 
Although the ABP Agreement does not contain the words "full and 
complete", this terminology was not of primary importance to the 
Freund Court. Moreover, such terminology is not necessary in light 
of comparative negligence. Unlike Freund,! in the instant case, 
there was only one type of indemnification that could be provided -
indemnification for the negligence of ABP. In light of 
comparative negligence, the "full and complete" language is 
surplusage. 
*The plaintiff in Freund was injured in 1981 -- meaning 
joint and several liability was still in effect. Freund, 793 
P.2d 364. 
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JB and Clark also argue- that the ABP Agreement is 
distinguishable because the Freund agreement provides for indemnity 
for liability arising out of the attachment of the cable equipment 
to the poles. However, the ABP Agreement contains language with 
the same effect. It provides for indemnity from liability 
"resulting directly or indirectly" from Clark's "performance of 
this contract." Clark's performance of the ABP Agreement included 
contracting with and supervising JB to cut the hole in the floor 
through which Mr. Healey fell. Therefore, the claims of negligence 
against ABP resulted from Clark's performance of the ABP Agreement. 
Finally, Clark argues that the ABP Agreement does not 
indemnify ABP for its own negligence because it only indemnifies 
for liability resulting directly or indirectly from Clark's 
performance of the contract.2 As noted above, however, ABP's 
negligence did result from Clark's performance of the ABP 
Agreement. 
D. The ABP Agreement Is Not similar To The Indemnity 
Provision In Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp. 
JB and Clark both noted that ABP did not include Ericksen 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993) in its analysis 
2Clark did not deny, as required by Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the 
Code of Judicial Administration, paragraph 1 of ABP's statement 
of uncontested facts, which states that J.B. Sheet Metal's 
failure to secure the hole was a proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. J.B. Sheet Metal also effectively fails to dispute 
this fact saying in its responsive memorandum "this is not a 
statement of fact, but is instead a conclusion or argument." 
(R. 1498) . 
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of indemnity agreements, Ericksen was not cited because it is not 
on point. 
Ericksen concerns the liability of a building inspector 
employed by Salt Lake City Corporation who inadvertently injured a 
construction worker when he dislodged a ladder supported by a 
garage door. Id. at 997. The indemnification provision in 
Ericksen is considerably narrower than the ABP or Freund 
Agreements. Most notably, the Ericksen agreement does not contain 
the word "liabilities" nor does the agreement cover liability 
caused by a building inspector employed by the City. The Ericksen 
indemnity agreement provided that the contractor would indemnify 
the city for claims#"which may arise out of any act or failure to 
act, work or other activity related in any way to the project, by 
the contractor, its agents, subcontractors, materialmen or 
employees. Id. at 998. (emphasis added.) Because the building 
inspector was not employed by the contractor nor was he the 
Contractor's "agent", "sub-contractor" or "material man" there was 
no indemnity. Id. at 998. Thus, both the facts and the indemnity 
agreement preclude application of Ericksen to the facts before this 
Court. 
III. UTAH COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW LEADS TO ONE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE ABP AGREEMENT: THAT IT INDEMNIFIES ABP FOR ITS OWN 
NEGLIGENCE. 
Four years before the ABP Agreement was executed, Utah 
abandoned the concept of joint and several liability and replaced 
it with comparative negligence. JB and Clark argue that reliance 
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on comparative negligence impermissibly results in a "rewritten11 
contract. In fact, the opposite is true. Ignoring the law in 
effect when a contract is executed would result in a "rewritten" 
contract. This Court must interpret the ABP Agreement in light of 
comparative negligence and specifically Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38. 
Indeed, Freund requires an analysis of the "surrounding circumstances," 
including existing law, when interpreting an indemnity agreement. 
A. The Only Reasonable Interpretation Of The ABP Agreement 
Is to Indemnify ABP For its Own Negligence, 
Clark and JB argue that there are other meanings or 
purposes for the indemnity provisions in the ABP Agreement. All of 
the examples cited, however, are outside of the tort realm. For 
example, Clark and JB argue that the provisions in question 
indemnify for nonperformance of contract or administrative 
sanctions. 
Although the ABP Agreement does cover such contingencies, 
it is clearly broader than that, because it specifically covers 
claims for "injuries to or death of persons." Given comparative 
negligence, if the provision is to have any meaning in tort, it 
must indemnify for ABP's negligence. 
B. Contracts Contain The Law In Effect At The Time Of 
Execution And Should Be Construed According To Those 
Laws, 
In its initial memorandum, ABP cited Washington National 
Insurance Co. v. Sherwood Associates, 795 P.2d 665 (Utah App. 
1990) , for the proposition that all contracts contain the law in 
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effect at the time of their execution. Clark and JB respond to 
this by arguing three things. First, they argue Washington 
National raises a factual issue as to whether the parties to the 
ABP Agreement considered the Liability Reform Act; Second, they 
argue Washington National is not on point because it involved 
different facts; and Third, that this principle is too broad and 
would cause courts to rewrite every contract in light of existing 
laws. 
Washington National notes several concepts regarding 
contract interpretation which preclude these arguments. According 
to Washington National, contracts implicitly contain laws existing 
at the time of execution. Id. at 669. Contracts embrace laws 
which affect their validity, construction, discharge and 
enforcement, and courts assume that "parties' contract with 
knowledge of their existing legal rights." Id. fn. 7. 
In other words, this Court must begin with the premise 
that the parties executed the ABP agreement with knowledge of 
existing Utah law. Interpreting the contract in light of this law 
does not make the contract better than it is - - it only makes it as 
good as it is supposed to be. 
The attempt to distinguish Washington National on its 
facts is also not persuasive because other courts have set out the 
same basic principles. See Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 237 P.2d 
1058 (Idaho 1951) (stating "It is axiomatic that extant law is 
written into and made part of every written contract"); Robinson v. 
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Joint Sch. Dist. #150, 596 P.2d 436, 439 (Idaho 1979) (stating "It 
appears to be the law in almost every state, if not all, that 
existing law becomes part of a contract, just as though the 
contract contains an express provision to that effect (unless a 
contrary intent is disclosed). Citing 17 Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 257 
(1964) . Neel v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 675 P.2d 
96, 102 (Mont. 1984) (stating that laws "existing at the date a 
contract is executed are as much a part of the contract as if set 
forth therein.") 
Finally, as a corollary to these arguments, JB also 
argues that it is not necessary to give all provisions of a 
contract legal effect. Once again, JB ignores Utah law requiring, 
if possible, that all provisions be given legal effect. See Stangl 
v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976) (stating "A construction giving 
an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be 
adopted where reasonable, and between two possible constructions 
that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract"); Hall v. 
Schulte, 836 P.2d 989, 993 (Ariz. App. 1992) (stating "the 
interpretation which is placed on an agreement should be one that 
gives reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all the terms.") 
Citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(A) (1981). 
C, The Utah Supreme Court And Other Courts Recocmize The 
Importance Of Comparative Nealiaence Law, 
In Brown v. Boyer-Washington Blvd. Assoc. 856 P.2d 352, 
355 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court of Utah recognized how the 
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interpretation of an indemnity agreement would be affected by 
comparative negligence law. The Brown court noted that agreements 
to shield one from the negligence of another are not necessary 
under comparative negligence. 
Other courts also note the effect of comparative 
negligence. In Bosse v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, Etc.. 646 
F.2d 689, 693 (1st Cir. 1981), the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit held that, given comparative negligence, an 
agreement would be pointless if it was not construed to indemnify 
the indemnitee for its own negligence. JB dismisses Bosse by 
arguing that the indemnity provision was not similar to the 
provisions in this case. However, this does not affect the 
analysis used by the Bosse Court nor does it undermine the 
persuasiveness of the arguments relied on by the Court.3 
3In its principal brief, ABP also cited cases from other 
jurisdictions with language similar to the language in the ABP 
Agreement. JB dismisses the cases by arguing that other 
jurisdictions may not apply strict construction. However, it is 
clear that the court in Fischbach-Natkin v. Power Process Piping, 
403 N.W.2d at 571, applied strict construction and still 
concluded that the agreement provided indemnification for the 
indemnitee's own negligence. The key language in Fischbach was 
"all liability or claimed liability for injuries." Id. at 571. 
Likewise, in Public Service Company v. United Cable. 829 P.2d 
1280 (Colo. 1992) the indemnity language was very similar to the 
language in the ABP Agreement and the court cited Freund for the 
proposition that the use of the word "liabilities" was 
significant in concluding that a party was indemnified for its 
own negligence. 
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D. ABP's Analysis Regarding The Effect Of Comparative 
Negligence Is Not A New Argument On Appeal. 
ABP filed two summary judgment memoranda in the lower 
court, which both make the comparative negligence argument.4 Both 
memoranda cite the comparative negligence statute and note that it 
is determinative to the motions. ABP also specifically argued: 
The Liability Reform Act protects A.B.P. from 
third-party liability for another's 
negligence, including the negligence of J.B. 
Sheet Metal, but A.B.P. contracted Clark 
Mechanical for protection against all 
liability, including its own negligence. The 
purpose of the indemnity agreement was to 
protect A.B.P. Enterprises from paying damages 
resulting from Clark Mechanical or its sub-
contractor, J.B. Sheet Metals' actions or 
omissions, and the purpose was to have that 
protection regardless of whether the threat 
was realized as a claim that A.B.P. was 
negligent or in some other form. 
(R. 1084.) 
The argument regarding comparative negligence asserted 
below by ABP was reasonably discernible and gave the trial court an 
opportunity to make findings of law on that subject. 
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD FURTHER RELAX THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE. 
Agreements indemnifying a party for its own negligence 
should no longer be strictly construed. As this Court noted in 
Pickhover. 771 P.2d at 667, the national trend is away from strict 
4ABP filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against JB (R. 1174) 
and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Partial 
Summary Judgment against Clark. (R. 1084) Both briefs made this 
argument. 
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construction. The public policy considerations mandating strict 
construction have lost most of their relevance over time. 
Virtually all indemnity contracts now require insurance. The ABP 
Agreement and the Subcontract Agreement required JB and Clark to 
provide insurance coverage for the types of claims at issue in this 
appeal. 
The existence of insurance and Utah's Comparative 
Negligence statute obviate the need for strict construction. 
Because of these changes, the judicial protections required in an 
earlier era have lost their importance. This Court should follow 
Freund in further relaxing the strict construction rule. 
V. THE ABP AGREEMENT DOES NOT INDEMNIFY FOR SOLE NEGLIGENCE AND 
IS THEREFORE VALID. 
One issue which was raised in the summary judgment 
motions, but which was not resolved by the District Court, involves 
the application of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1. Although Rule 30(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide this Court with 
discretion to resolve this issue, it is not part of the order from 
which this appeal was taken. This Court, therefore, has discretion 
as to whether these issues should be addressed on appeal. 
A. The ABP Agreement Does Not Purport To Indemnify ABP For 
Its Sole Negligence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 states that construction 
contracts "purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability 
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to 
property caused by or resulting from sole negligence of the 
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promisee" are void. (Emphasis added.) The ABP Agreement does not 
purport to indemnify for sole negligence. The ABP Agreement 
premises all liability on claims resulting from "Sub-Contractor's 
performance of this contract." (R. 1077.) Even in the abstract, 
it would be virtually impossible to conceive of a factual setting 
where ABP could be solely negligent for acts falling within Clark's 
obligations under the contract. 
When the actual facts before the Court are evaluated, it 
is clear that ABP was not solely negligent. In this case ABP 
contracted with Clark to do a portion of the work on the project. 
Clark in turn contracted with JB to do a portion of the work 
allocated to Clark. JB cut the hole in the floor which the 
plaintiff fell through.5 ABP was clearly not solely negligent. 
JB and Clark also alleged, in pleadings filed in the 
lower court, that the accident was caused, in part, by Healey's 
employer and his co-employees. (R. 328, 347-48) . JB and Clark 
thus implicitly concur that ABP was not solely negligent. 
B. The ABP Agreement Should Not Be Interpreted In A Way That 
Renders It Void. 
As noted above, Stangl v. Todd. 554 P.2d at 1320, holds 
that when confronted with two possible interpretations of a 
contract, a court should adopt the interpretation which would give 
5JB argues that there were no findings of negligence in this 
case. However, JB does not deny that its employee cut the hole 
in the floor and covered the hole with a piece of heating duct. 
For purpose of this appeal, Clark has also clearly admitted the 
negligence of JB. See footnote 2. 
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the contract effect.6 As it is reasonable to interpret the ABP 
Agreement as not indemnifying for sole negligence, this Court 
should do so. Clark and JB argue that this principle is too broad 
and would result in rewriting void contracts to make them valid. 
In this case, however, it would be more than reasonable to 
interpret the limiting language cited above as excluding indemnity 
for ABP's sole negligence and would not entail rewriting or even 
stretching the agreement. 
C. This Court's Ruling In Jacobsen Construction Company v. 
Blaine Supports ABP's Reading Of The Contract. 
Clark and JB argue that Jacobsen Construction Company v. 
Blaine Construction Co., 225 U.A.R. 20 (Utah 1993), Petition for 
Cert, filed, Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Blaine Construction Co., 
230 U.A.R. 46 (Utah 1994) is on point and supports their argument 
that the ABP contract purports to indemnify ABP for its sole 
negligence. However, in Jacobsen this Court specifically found 
language in the agreement that purported to indemnify for sole 
passive negligence. This Court reasoned that because the agreement 
6A related legal concept is expressed in Section 184(2) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which discusses partial 
enforceability of provisions which are void on public policy 
grounds. The Restatement requires enforcement to the extent the 
provision is non-violative of public policy. The restatement 
rule is now the majority position. Data Management, Inc. v. 
Greene, 757 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1988). The first part of the 
rule was adopted by this court in Nielson v. Nielson, 780 P.2d 
1264, 1270 (Utah App. 1989). The second part of the rule has 
also been widely adopted in the Western states. See Hopper v. 
All Pet Animal Clinic Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 546 (Wyo. 1983); Data 
Management. 757 P.2d at 64. 
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specifically excluded indemnity for sole active negligence, it 
purported to indemnify for sole passive negligence. The ABP 
Agreement, however, is silent on the specific issue of sole 
negligence and, therefore, indemnity for sole negligence cannot be 
inferred from a specific provision in the ABP Agreement as it was 
in Jacobsen. On the contrary, the implication from the phrase 
"resulting directly or indirectly from [Clark's] performance of the 
contract" is that ABP is not indemnified for sole negligence. 
VI. JB MUST INDEMNIFY ABP BECAUSE ABP IS A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
OF JB'S SUB-CONTRACT WITH CLARK. 
The JB Agreement references the ABP Agreement and in the 
JB Agreement, JB specifically agreed to assume toward Clark all 
obligations and responsibility that Clark assumed towards the 
owner. In this case, the owner is ABP (a subsidiary of 
WordPerfect). ABP is a third-party beneficiary of the JB Agreement 
and JB is bound by the indemnity provisions in the ABP Agreement. 
In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1989), the Supreme Court of Utah held that the intention to 
create "intended beneficiary" rights "is to be determined from the 
terms of the contract as well as the surrounding facts and 
circumstances." JB read and signed the agreement to be bound by 
the terms of the ABP Agreement and is therefore bound by the terms 
of the ABP Agreement and must indemnify ABP in accordance with the 
indemnity provisions. 
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VII. THE ABP AGREEMENT AND THE JB AGREEMENT WERE NEGOTIATED AT 
ARM'S LENGTH. 
JB argues that the agreements between the parties may not 
have been negotiated at arm's length and therefore may be void. To 
support this, J.B. states that sub-contractors are "required to 
enter into the contracts prepared by the owner or general 
contractor." There is absolutely no evidence in the record to 
suggest that there was unequal bargaining power or that JB was 
coerced. JB does not even attempt to explain its contention that 
the negotiations were conducted at less than arm's length, but 
simply states without proof that agreements between contractors and 
sub-contractors are generally not arm's length agreements. This 
does not justify invalidating the agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, ABP respectfully requests that 
this Court overrule the District Court's determination that ABP is 
not entitled to indemnity and rule as a matter of law that the ABP 
Agreement clearly manifests the parties' intent that ABP is to be 
indemnified for its own negligence. The Court should also rule 
that the indemnity provision is not void under Utah Code Ann. § 13-
8-1. 
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13-8-1. Construction industry — Agreements to 
indemnify. 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding 
in, or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or 
agreement relative to the construction, alteration, re-
pair or maintenance of a building, structure, high-
way, appurtenance and appliance, including moving, 
demolition and excavating connected therewith, pur-
porting to indemnify the promisee against liability 
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or 
damage to property caused by or resulting from the 
sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or em-
ployees, or indemnitee, is against public policy and is 
void and unenforceable. 
This act will not be construed to affect or impair 
the obligations of contracts or agreements, which are 
in existence at the time the act becomes effective. 
1969 
78-27-38. Comparative negligence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. He may recover 
from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is lia-
ble to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault at tr ibutable to that 
defendant. 1986 
